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THE PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES OF SURVIVAL* Michael D. Hurd and Kathleen McGarry
Although expectations, or more precisely stubjective probability distribtutions, play a prominent role in models of decision making uinder uincertainty, we have had very little data on them.
Based on panel data from the Health and Retirement Stu-dy, we stu-dy the evolution of su-bjective stur-vival probabilities and their ability to predict actual mortality. In panel, respondents modify their survival probabilities in response to new information such as the onset of a new disease condition. Stubjective survival probabilities predict acttual survival: those who surnived in the panel reported sturTival probabilities approximately 50% greater at baseline than those who died.
Individual behaviour depends notjust on the current state of the world but also on what individuals expect will happen in the future: individuals choose their desired years of schooling based on expected future income; engage in family planning based on expected fertility; and save for retirement based on their expected length of life. Researchers wishing to understand these behaviours must therefore incorporate expectations into their models.' Despite the importance of expectations, we rarely have data on the expectations of individuals and, therefore, have had to make assumptions about them. Often, individuals are assumed to face probabilities equal to the average population probabilities. For example, when survival probabilities are needed in economic models of savings behaviour, researchers use survival probabilities calculated from life tables. When forecasting future income, average incorne of a similar demographic group is often used. In many cases, however, average values will not be the appropriate measure for most individuals: subjective probabilities are likely to differ across individuals, and individuals will choose their behaviours based on their own probabilities. Studies which assume that individuals base their behaviours on population probabilities may therefore give misleading results.
A potential improvement over population probabilities is to base models on an individual's own subjective probability.2 Such probabilities could be constructed from responses in household surveys about the probabilities of important outcomes such as survival, income, and health status. For example, an individual's report of his subjective probability of surviving to a particular age could be used Hurd thanks the National Instittute on Agin-g for financial stupport. McGarry gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Brookdale Fotundation.
l Althotugh we uise the word 'expectations', it is the probability distributions of future events that typically eniter into behavioural models. For example, it is not life expectancy that helps to determine savings btit rather the probability distribtution of the random date of death. For simplicity, we will refer to subjective probabilities as expectations as long as there is no ambiguity.
2 Bernheimn (1989 Bernheimn ( , 1990 ) discuissed some inherent limitations of asking respondents about expectations (as opposed to stubjective probabilities). Most importantly, 'expectation' may not be understood by respondents. For example, Bernheimn presents evidence that respondents seemed to think of the mode or most likely age of retirement rather than the mathematical expectation of retirement age. In contrast the probability of retiring by a given age is well defiined. along with life table probabilities to construct an individual-specific survival curve (Hurd et al., 1998) . Using these individual-specific survival curves and the corresponding mortality hazards, researchers could explain the variation across individuals in behaviour that depends on perceived mortality risk.
Because of their potential usefulness, some household surveys have begun to ask about subjective probabilities, and studies analysing the validity of responses to these questions have found encouraging results.3 Dominitz and Manski (1997) analysed data on expected future income from the Survey of Economic Expectations and concluded that 'the subjective income distributions do meaningfully express the main features of respondents' income expectations' (p. 861). Dominitz (1998) proposed and estimated a statistical model which is capable of producing estimates of the expected value and variance of future income, rather than just points on the probability distribution. He found that these measures have predictive power for future earnings, that they can be combined with data on actual income to understand better the income generating process and, in a panel context, they are related positively to changes in actual earnings. These results provide validation for subjective probability measures of future earnings.
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Asset and Health Dynamics Study (AHEAD) ask respondents a number of expectational questions including the probability of surviving to a target age, and the probability of working past normal retirement age. The questions in the HRS have been studied, and they can reasonably be interpreted to be subjective probabilities McGarry, 1993, 1995) . The sample averages of the survival probabilities are close to survival probabilities calculated from life tables, and they covary with known risk factors in such a way that it is likely that they will predict actual survival. Probabilities of labour force participation also covary with known determinants of retirement and have successfully been used in models of retirement behaviour (Hurd and McGarry, 1996) . Although these cross-section analyses of subjective survival probabilities have been valuable, we are far from having a complete understanding of the properties of individual responses. We need to learn whether individuals adjust their reported probabilities in response to new information, whether these reported probabilities contain information not available in more traditional variables, and whether the probabilities predict actual outcomes. If we can establish these properties, we will be more confident that subjective probabilities provide information that is relevant to the decision-making process and can be used in our behavioural models.
In this paper, we address some of these issues by studying the responses to questions about survival probabilities. Survival probabilities are important to many areas of economics. For example, they are a major component of life-cycle models where mortality risk is an important determinate of behaviour. Survival probabilities could therefore be used to study purchases of life insurance and annuities, or to understand the choice of retirement age. In health economics, subjective probabilities of survival could be used to study risk-taking behaviour such as smoking and drug use. And in developmental economics, an individual's beliefs about the survival probabilities of her children could be used to study fertility decisions and investment in child welfare. As these examples show, if subjective probabilities were accorded the same status of validity and reliability as other variables, their applications would be many and broad. Yet, we have only limited understanding of the formation of the probabilities, their evolution over time and their predictive powers. The goal of our paper is to increase our knowledge of these properties.4
The organisation of the paper is as follows: Section 1 describes the data we use in this study and our measure of survival probabilities. In Section 2, we examine the evolution of probabilities over time, focusing on how individuals update their expectations with the arrival of new information and, in Section 3, we test whether these probabilities contain information not available in subjective measures of health status. Section 4 compares actual mortality outcomes in the panel with reported survival probabilities to assess the predictive validity of our probability measures.
Data
Our data on individual survival probabilities come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a biennial panel survey of individuals born in the years 1931-41 and their spouses. In 1992, when the first round of interviews was conducted, the sample was representative of the community-based US population aged approximately 51-61. The baseline sample contains 12,652 observations. The second wave of data from the HRS was collected in 1994, and 11,492 of the original 12,652 respondents were interviewed. We restrict our attention to those who were 46-65 at the first interview. We use this sample rather than the age-representative sample so as to increase the number of observations and, in particular, the number of observed deaths. At times, we will further limit our sample to those born in 1931-41 to make population comparisons. In addition to the age restriction, we also exclude observations in which the interview was completed by a proxy re-equals absolutely certain, what do you think are the chances you will live to be 75 or more?
The question was repeated with the target age of 85. Similar questions were asked in wave 2, except that respondents were asked to report the chances on a 0-100 point scale. We have rescaled the responses in each wave so that their range is zero to one, and we treat them as probabilities. Table 1 shows the average reported probability of surviving to age 75 (which we term P75) and to age 85 (P85) in both wave 1 and wave 2 for the populationrepresentative portion of our sample (those born in the years 1931-41). We compare these averages with the survival probabilities calculated from a 1990 life table weighted to reflect the sample composition in wave 1 and in wave 2. We expect that actual survival rates in our HRS sample will be greater than life table rates for two reasons. First, the HRS initially surveyed only the non-institutionalised population. Although the rate of institutionalisation in this age group is low, the survival rates for the institutionalised population are likely to be below average, causing the HRS survival rates to be greater than the population average. Second, we do not have data on subjective probabilities for those who were interviewed by proxy. This group is also likely to have lower-than-average survival rates.
Despite these expected differences, the average subjective survival probabilities in each wave are close to the life table averages, particularly the values for P75.6
The difference between P85 and the life table rate is substantially greater than that for P75, implying that respondents overestimate the conditional probability of survival to 85 given survival to 75.7 Women give higher average probabilities than men, as-they should, although the differences are smaller than the life table differences. A possible explanation is that when forming expectations, individuals take into account the actual mortality experience of those around them, including both men and women, and fail to adjust fully for differences between the sexes.
Extensive analyses of other cross-sectional patterns have been carried out in Hurd and McGarry (1995) and Schoenbaum (1997) and we refer the interested reader to those articles. The general conclusion to be drawn from these efforts is that reported probabilities vary with known risk factors such as smoking, and show the expected differences with respect to indicators of socio-economic status.
Subjective survival probabilities increase with income, wealth and schooling, are lower for nonwhites than for whites, and are lower for those who smoke. We have verified that these patterns continue to hold in wave 2 of the HRS, but do not discuss the results here. However, several of the comparisons for the wave 2 data are reported in the appendix, Table Al. 6; The response rate on the question about survival to age 75 was 98.3% in wave 1 and 97.4% in wave 2.
There was little difference in the response rate in wave 1 according to whether the responident died between waves 1 and 2. High response rates to queries about subjective probabilities are in contrast to the low response rates on questions about expectations (Hurd and McGarry, 1995) With one exception, changes from wave 1 to wave 2 in the subjective survival probabilities are negative whereas the life table, of course, shows increases. Among women, the differences are statistically significant, but not among men. We will discuss below some possible reasons for the discrepancy.
Changes in Survival Probabilities
In Table 2 , we investigate in more detail the declines in the average subjective probabilities. Consistent with the decrease in average probabilities, more individuals reported a decline in P75 than an increase: 39% of respondents report a lower value in wave 2 than in wave 1, 34% report a higher value, and 27% report exactly the same value. Of those reporting identical probabilities, the majority report 0.0 (2%), 0.5 (10%) or 1.0 (9%). At least some of the reporting of identical values is likely due to a general tendency to report focal point values. At the extremes of 0.0 and 1.0, however, particularly pessimistic or optimistic people may reasonably think that their survival chances are negligible or almost certain.8
The observed decline in the survival probability is not consistent with simple probability laws. Standard probability theory predicts that the probability of surviving to age 75, conditional on having lived an additional two years, should be greater than the original unconditional probability. However, it is likely that subjective survival probabilities change over time in response to new information. If new information causes respondents to become more pessimistic, on average, then we would expect a decline in the average probabilities. We will investigate the determinants of change below.9
When individuals make projections about their survival probability, they ought to incorporate into their estimation expectations about future changes in health Table 2 Comparison of Survival Probabilities in Wave 1 and Wave 2
Percentage of HRS respondents Probability comparison P75 P85
Wave 1 probability > Wave 2 probability 39.1 42.8 Wave 1 probability < Wave 2 probability 34.1 35.4 Wave 1 probability = Wave 2 probability 26.9 21.7 Both probabilities = 0 2.1 8.0
Both probabilities = 0.5 9.9 4.7 Both probabilities= 1.0 9.2 2.9 Both probabilities = some other value 5.7 6.1
Sample is individuals age 46-65 in wave 1 who answered the probability question in both interviews. Number of observations is 9,055 (P75) and 9,178 (P85).
and other factors contributing to survival. Thus, it should be unexpected changes or new information that affect changes in reported probabilities. The most obvious explanation for changes in P75 across waves is an unanticipated change in health.
The most comprehensive single measure of health status in the HRS is self-rated health where the respondent rates his or her health as excellent, very good, good, fair or poor. The top panel of Table 3 shows the distributions of health status in waves 1 and 2, and the transition rates from each health state in wave 1 to each health state in wave 2. In wave 1, about 24% of respondents rated their health as excellent, but in wave 2 just 19% reported excellent health. Such modest average declines are likely to be expected and, if they are expected, they should not result in a modification of P75. The largest entries in the health transition matrix are on the diagonal, meaning that no change in health was the modal transition. The likelihood of large health changes is rather small: the probability of declining from excellent health in wave 1 to poor health in wave 2 is just 0.005. Because such large changes, particularly decrements, are likely not to be expected, they should result in a reduction in P75.
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the change in P75 (wave 2 -wave 1) corresponding to changes in health status.10 Among those whose health was unchanged between waves (the diagonal), the survival probability decreased slightly, and several of the changes are significant. For respondents who reported being in excellent health in both waves, the average change in P75 was -0.017.
There are at least two explanations for this decrease. First, the health categories may be too coarse, so that there are actual declines in health even within categories. For this age group in particular, health is likely to be declining on average so that even those who place themselves in the same broad category may be less healthy than they were previously. Under this interpretation, P75 is a more sensitive measure of health status than the traditional five-category self-assessed health status measure. The second explanation is that information other than current health status influences an individual's determination of his survival probability.
We will return to this point later.
1( Results based on P85 are similar.
? Royal Economic Society 2002 Sample is those aged 46-65 in wave 1 and reporting P75 and health status in both waves. Average change in survival probabilities (wave 2 -wave 1) was -0.014. 9,048 observations.
Below the diagonal in Table 2 , health worsened between the waves and, in all cases, P75 decreased as well. Some of the declines were very large, especially those associated with a decline to poor health. For example, among those who were in good health in wave 1 and in poor health in wave 2, the average subjective survival probability declined by 0.158. Entries above the diagonal correspond to an improvement in health, and with one exception (the transition from poor to very good) the changes in P75 were positive. For example, among those who reported being in fair health in wave 1 and excellent health in wave 2, the survival probability increased by 0.188.
These findings are qualitatively the same as we have found in cross-section, but quantitatively the cross-section relationships are larger. This difference is to be expected in that additional factors that influence P75 vary in cross-section but not in panel. An unexpected decline in health from very good to poor is not accompanied by changes in many of the risk factors that may vary across individuals who differ in health. Education is a good example: individuals with little education tend to have worse health, and education has predictive power for survival. In Table 3 , the change in P75 associated with a transition from very good to poor health is -0.220; in cross-section, this difference in health is associated with a difference in P75 of -0.32 (Hurd and McGarry, 1995, Table 6 ). This kind of difference holds for all comparisons based on the significant effects in Table 3 : the cross-section difference in P75 is 0.05 to 0.12 greater than the panel difference.
We conclude that the relationship between health change in the panel and the change in the survival probability accords qualitatively with our expectations: those an improvement in health increased their survival probability.
Although there is a clear path from the onset of diseases to self-assessed health and to survival probabilities, the survival probabilities ought, in addition, to be affected by events that change survival chances but not current health. To study this difference between self-assessed health and subjective survival probabilities, we estimated changes in subjective survival probabilities as a function of new health information as well as other information that ought to affect survival but not current health.
Analysis of changes rather than levels also allows us to control for unobserved differences across individuals. In cross-sections, P75 and P85 vary in reasonable ways with a number of observable characteristics, such as the frequency of exercise, disease conditions and smoking status (Hurd and McGarry, 1995) . However, this kind of variation does not imply causality. It may be that there exist unobserved measures of healthiness and optimism that are correlated with both reported life expectancy and with observable characteristics. In the panel, we can specify a relationship that can more reasonably be interpreted to be causal because we can relate changes in the subjective survival probability to changes in observable characteristics that are at least partly unexpected, for example the death of a parent or the onset of disease."
We recognise that the amount of new information in those events could vary from person to person. For example, were we to query respondents about the probability of the onset of cancer, we would likely find variation in such probabilities. To the extent that these probabilities predict actual onset of cancer, the amount of new information in actual onset will vary from person to person and, hence, the effect of the onset of cancer on P75 will vary. Were we to have observations on the subjective probability of the onset of cancer, we could verify this observation. However, we do not, and so it is an empirical question about the magnitude of the revision of P75 that will acommpany an onset.
Because the left-hand variable can take only values lying between -1 and +1, we use a variant of a logistic transformation to restrict the predicted values to this range, and estimate the model by nonlinear least squares. The equation we estimate is e-x13 AP75 = 1 -2 exfl Table 4 has the coefficients and standard errors from the regression of the changes in P75 and P85 (wave 2 -wave 1) on changes in the survivorship of the respondent's parents, spouse and siblings, and on onset of disease conditions. The average change in P75 was -0.014 and the change in P85 was -0.022. Table 4 also shows the estimated effects on P75 and P85 (the derivatives). They are found by evaluating AP75 at its mean. 12
In an ordinary least squares framework, this would be a first-differenced regression controlling for individual effects.
l We obtain nearly identical results from linear estimation in terms of the derivatives in Table 4 and the significance levels.
(? Royal Economic Society 2002 Table 4 Nonlinear Regression of the Change in the Subjective Survival Probability The effect of a parent's death on self-assessed survival probabilities is likely to operate through both biological and psychological mechanisms. For example, if the parent died of a type of cancer which is known to have a genetic link, the child might correctly reassess his own life expectancy. In addition, a parent's death may also affect the respondent's reported probability because it reminds him of his own mortality. We found in cross-section that the age of parents, if alive, and their age at death, if deceased, were related to P75 and P85 but in a more complex way than these examples suggest: if the age of a living parent or the age at death was less than 75 or greater than 85, that age affected P75 and P85 in approximately the same way; but if the age was greater than 75 but less than 85, it affected them differently. For example, if a parent died at 80, it had little effect on P75 but a substantial effect on P85. Because of this, we expect that the death of a parent will lead to changes in the reported survival probabilities, but that the change will depend on the age of the parent at death. For example, if a parent died at age 80, it may not affect the respondent's assessment of his probability of living to age 75, but could affect the probability of living to 85.
( Royal Economic Society 2002
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As shown in Table 4 , the death of a mother has numerically large effects on changes in survival probabilities and the effects approximately follow the pattern that we found in cross-section. If the respondent's mother died between waves and was younger than 75 at her death, the respondent reduced P75 by 0.12, and P85 by 0.20. These changes are rather large given an average P75 of about 0.64 and P85 of 0.41. If the mother died at age 75 or older, the survival probability of living to age 75 was not reduced significantly, but there was a significant reduction in P85.
Apparently, respondents distinguish between P75 and P85 in a rather fine manner:
the death of a mother between 75 and 85 years of age does not affect their survival to age 75 but it does their survival to 85. These panel changes are qualitatively similar to the cross-section variation.
As far as P75 is concerned, the effect of a father dying is about the same as that of a mother dying. If the death occurs when the father is younger than 75, P75 is reduced by 0.25, but if the death is at older ages there is no significant effect.
There are no significant effects on P85 of the father dying, although if he died before 75 the magnitude is fairly large.'3
In cross-section, the vital status of a mother or the vital status of a father had different effects depending on the sex of a child: males focused on their fathers and females on their mothers. Here, we allow for differing responses by sex in each equation by including the interaction of a categorical variable indicating the death of a mother or father with a categorical variable indicating that the respondent is male. In the P75 equation, neither of the interaction terms is significantly different from zero, although the direction of their effects is to reduce the responsiveness of P75 to a parent's death for males in the sample. With respect to P85, however, the interaction is substantial. The effect of a mother's death for male respondents is significantly smaller than for females. For males, if a mother died before age 75, the net effect is equal to -0.104 (-0.200 + 0.096) . In contrast to the estimated effects of a mother's death, the effect of a father's death is slightly larger for males than for females, although the difference is not statistically significant.
Because there are no genetic links between spouses, one would expect the impact of the death of a spouse to be largely psychological. Although the literature on the bereavement effect has not settled on a numerical magnitude of the effects of widowing, it does suggest that such psychological effects can have real health influences leading to increased mortality (Korenman et al., 1997) . Indeed, we find that the death of a spouse has a large and significantly negative effect on subjective survival to age 75. The effect on survival to age 85 is smaller, and not significantly different from zero.14 In contrast to the effects of parental and spousal deaths, the death of a sibling has no effect in either equation, even though siblings share -3 The mothers of 4.2% of respondents died between waves compared to 3.0% who had a father die.
Although fathers are older than mothers on average and face higher mortality rates, the more frequent deaths of mothers result from the fact that many more respondents had a mother alive in wave 1 than had a father alive, 43% versus 19%. similar genetic make-up with the respondent. Perhaps respondents are less close psychologically to siblings than to parents or a spouse and, therefore, less affected by the death of a sibling. Or, perhaps siblings who died at these relatively young ages died for reasons that are less affected by genetic factors and due more to lifestyle choices such as smoking or to accidents.
The remainder of Table 4 has effects associated with the onset of disease between the two waves. All the coefficients in each equation are negative, although with the exception of the effects of cancer, the estimates are not significantly different from zero, most likely becauise of the small number of new cases.15
Nonetheless, the results show that respondents reduced their subjective survival probabilities at a new diagnosis, particularly for conditions that are more life threatening, such as cancer.16
We find no evidence of this effect (Table 5) . For example, if the mother died between the waves and her age at death was less than 75, the respondent was more likely to have an improvement in health between waves (coefficient of 0.367) and more likely to have a worsening in health (coefficient of 0.520), than to have stable health status, although neither of the coefficient estimates is significantly different from zero. If the mother died between the ages of 75 and 85, the probability of an improvement in health fell and the probability of worsening of health increased but the effects are not significant. Nearly all coefficients for the death of a father act to reduce the probability of changing states, and none is significantly different from zero. The death of a spouse increased the probability of an improvement in health status and decreased the probability of a worsening of status, but the effects are not significant.'8
In contrast to these weak and contradictory effects, the onset of a disease affects current health status in the expected manner. The coefficients on the disease measures typically increase (significantly) the probability of moving to worse health and, in most cases, decrease the probability of improved health, or else have no significant effect.
Because diseases lower both reported health status and the reported survival probability, while the death of a parent or of a spouse significantly lowers only the reported values of P75 and P85, we conclude that the subjective survival probabilities measure more than health status: they have an expectational component as well as a health-status component.
Mortality Outcomes

The Predictive Pozver of Subjective Probabilities of Survival
We have shown that individuals update their expectations in reasonable ways in response to new information. We now ask whether the survival probabilities predict actual mortality. In our sample of 11,090 wave 1 respondents, 183 died between wave 1 and wave 2, 10,642 survived, and the vital status of 265 others was unknown at wave 2.19 When weighted, these figures yield a mortality rate of 0.0169. Table 6 presents the inean subjective survival probability for each group as reported in the first wave. Those who died reported an average P75 of 0.45 compared to 0.65 for those who survived. Thus, at least in a gross way, the subjective survival probabilities predict mortality.20 Figure 1 shows the cumulative distributions of P75 for those who died compared with those who survived. Not only is the average different for these two groups, but the differences persist throughout the distributions. For example, about 11% of those who survived reported P75 to be 0.40 or less whereas 43% of those who died gave a value of 0.40 or less; the medians are 0.70 and 0.50. 20 Even were P75 to give accurate predictions of survival to age 75, it would not necessarily predict two-year survival. We could imagine a risk factor that is negligible over a short-term but has long-term cumulative effects, for example the take-up of smoking. Apparently, P75 does predict short-term mortality, but we will have to wait uintil a cohort reaches age 75 to find how well quantitatively it predicts survival to 75. Given its association with short-term survival, it would be surprising if it did not predict at least qualitatively survival to 75. Subjective survival probability shown), the mortality rate at 0.5 is not noticeably different from mortality rates in the range of 0.3 to 0.7, suggesting that respondents who report a value of 0.5 are drawn from nearby probability points. Mortality at zero is greater than at any other point except 0.1. The fact that it is lower than at 0.1 suggests reporting error by some respondents.21 Some individuals who answered with a zero did, in fact, have high mortality risk, but some may not have understood the probability question or simply gave a convenient focal response. Therefore, the responses at zero are a mixture of a high mortality rate for one group and a rate perhaps closer to average for another group.
The risk curve for P85 is considerably shallower, and even has an increase from 0.7 to 1.0. An implication is that P85 contains more observation error than P75.
This implication is consistent with the results in Table 1 where the average of P85 was considerably higher than the life table average.
We now examine how well the subjective survival probability at wave 1 predicts actual mortality for our sample of individuals age 46-65 whose mortality status is known. We estimate a logistic model where the left-hand side variable is equal to one if the individual died between waves and zero if he survived. The explanatory variables include P75 and other factors that ought to be correlated with mortality such as income, wealth, schooling, smoking behaviour and disease conditions. The first set of results in Table 7 reports the coefficient estimates, standard errors, and probability derivatives for this specification.22
The coefficient on P75 is significantly different from zero and fairly large. An increase in the probability from zero to 1.0 reduces the mortality hazard by 0.016, which is equal to the average mortality hazard. In a mortality model such as a proportional hazards model, this change would increase considerably the likelihood of survivorship to advanced age.
Mortality falls with income, but the effects are significantly different from zero only at the 6% level. A $100,000 increase in income decreases the mortality probability by 0.01 percentage points. The effects of wealth are smaller in magnitude and neither term is significantly different from zero. As one would expect, mortality increases significantly with age: the difference between the risk of a 51-year-old and a 61-year-old is about 0.01. Marital status per se has only a small negative effect. Apparently, the strong difference by marital status typically observed in data is in part the result of differences in other variables that are correlated with marital status such as disease conditions. Men have mortality rates about 0.009 higher than women, which is about the same as would be found in a life table for people of the HRS age range. Thus, even controlling for a large number of covariates does not reduce the male-female mortality differential.
Whites have lower mortality rates than non-whites after controlling for other risk factors and the effect is significantly different from zero at the 10% level. Smoking increases the mortality rate by over 75%, even after controlling for many other risk had a stroke all increase mortality risk by approximately 65%. New diagnoses of heart attack and heart failure are strong determinants of a decline in the subjective survival probability in Table 4 .
Even though a number of explanatory variables are significant, the model does not explain much of the variation in mortality outcomes: the pseudo R2 is just 0.025.24 Adding P75 to the other variables shown in the table increases the pseudo R2 by 7%.
Some may find it natural to think of the subjective survival probabilities as an alternative measure of overall health. To test whether the survival probabilities provide information beyond that contained in reported health status, we re-estimated the logistic model and included the subjective health measures from wave 1 as measured by four categorical health indicators as very good, good, fair or poor.
(Excellent health is the omitted category.)
As shown in the second set of results in Table 7 , P75 continues to have a negative and significant effect on the mortality probability, although the magnitude of the effect is reduced by half. A change in P75 from 0 to 1 increases the probability of dying between waves by 0.009. These results indicate that the subjective probability contains information in addition to subjective health as measured by the five-point scale, and it is reasonable to interpret it as an expectational component. The effects of the other variables are either attenuated or not altered. For example, among the disease conditions, cancer continues to have the largest effect, and the magnitude is reduced only slightly from the first set of estimates. Adding the four health variables increases the pseudo R2 by 14%.
Comparisons with Life Table Probabilities
As a check on the representativeness of the HRS mortality rates, we compare the mortality experience of the HRS respondents to mortality rates calculated from life This difference is likely due, at least in part, to selection of the sample. A greater fraction of men of this age group (51-61 years old) are in institutions than women.
By omitting the institutionalised population, HRS has omitted more institutionalised men than women. Thus, observed mortality rates of men in the sample would be expected to be biased downward relative to the population rates to a greater degree than for women.
A second reason for the difference could be from the forward-looking nature of the subjective survival probabilities: if respondents observe improvements in their health and in their future health prospects, they ought to revise upward their survival chances. A period life table is based on mortality at a point in time, and there will be a lag before health improvements are reflected in it. Of course, a period life table does not reflect expected improvements in health. Perhaps men observed that their health and health prospects had improved, and they stated these observations when they reported their subjective survival probabilities. Their improved health status resulted in actual mortality rates that are lower than those found in life tables.
Conclusion
Respondents can and will answer questions about subjective probabilities, and the response rates to such questions are very high. Previous research has established that the survival probabilities aggregate to averages that are close to life table averages, and that they covary with risk factors in a way that suggests that they will predict actual mortality. The objectives of this paper are to find how subjective probabilities evolve in response to new information and how well they predict mortality. These are essential steps before we can have confidence in their use to explain behaviour.
We found that subjective survival probabilities decline with the death of a parent, but that self-assessed health is not affected. We interpret this to mean that the subjective survival probabilities have an expectational element and that they are not simply an alternative measure of health status. Furthermore, the survival probabilities predict mortality. Those who survived from wave 1 to wave 2 of the HRS gave subjective survival probabilities in wave 1 that were about 50% higher than those who died between the waves. This predictive power remains even when self-assessed health status is controlled for.
We expect that these survival probabilities will prove to be useful as explanatory variables in economic models. For example, in life-cycle models, individual-specific mortality probabilities could be used to produce better estimates of the determinants of an individual's consumption and wealth trajectories. Their inclusion may help to explain apparent inconsistences and anomalies in data, such as increasing wealth during retirement and seemingly inadequate savings by some individuals before retirement: in the first case, some individuals may expect to be exceptionally long-lived and, in the second, they may have such small subjective survival chances that saving is not called for. Number varies by characteristic due to missing values of characteristics.
